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MISSOURI SECTION
COMMENTS
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF ABSENCE
OF PRIOR ACCIDENTS
Schillie v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 222 F. 2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955)
While employed as a member of defendant's steel bridge gang,
plaintiff's decedent climbed onto the upper part of a sloping batter
post of defendant's bridge. As decedent was attempting to direct
others from his position on the bridge, he fell and sustained injuries
which later resulted in his death. In an action for wrongful death
brought by the plaintiff as administratrix of decedent's estate, the
trial court permitted defendant's witnesses, also members of the
bridge crew, to testify that they had never heard or known of anyone
having fallen from the batter posts prior to decedent's fall. The jury
returned a verdict for defendant and the trial court rendered judg-
ment accordingly. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, following Missouri law,: held that the admission of such evi-
dence was reversible error.2
As a general rule, evidence of prior accidents is admissible in
negligence cases in the discretion of the trial judge.8 The proponent
of such evidence must establish to the trial judge's satisfaction both
that the evidence has probative value4 and is vital to his case, and that
its admission would not unduly prolong the trial, prejudice the jury,
or confuse the issues.' When such proof is made, evidence of prior
1. The case was tried in the federal court on diversity of citizenship. UnderRule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts are to
apply that rule of evidence--either federal or state-which favors the reception
of the evidence. There is no federal rule concerning the admissibility of evidence
regarding the non-occurrence of prior accidents; consequently, Missouri law was
applicable.
2. Schillie v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 222 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1955).3. Cogswell v. C. C. Anderson Stores Co., 68 Idaho 205, 192 P.2d 282 (1948);
Robitaille v. Netoco Community Theatre, Inc., 305 Mass. 265, 25 N.E.2d 749(1940) ; Henderson v. Bjork Monument Co., 222 Minn. 241, 24 N.W.2d 42 (1946) ;
Biener v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co 160 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. App. 1942); Trautman,Logical or Legal Relevancy-A 6onflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 398(1952); Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 190, 215 (1953). Some courts do not mention the
element of discretion. District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519, 524 (1882).A few courts have adopted an inflexible rule of exclusion. See, e.g., Fox Tucson
Theatres Corp. v. Lindsay, 47 Ariz. 388, 56 P.2d 183 (1936).
4. For example, the proponent must establish that the conditions at the time
of the prior accidents are similar to those existing at the time of plaintiff's injury.Magnuson v. City of Stockton, 116 Cal. App. 532, 3 P.2d 30 (1931); Robitaille v.
Netoco Community Theatre, Inc., 305 Mass. 265, 25 N.E.2d 749 (1940). The
.degree of strictness with which the similarity of conditions must be proved will
vary, of course, according to the purpose for which the evidence is offered.
5. McCoRmIcE, EviDENCF § 167 (1954).
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accidents is generally admitted for the jury's consideration on several
of the issues normally involved in negligence cases, e.g., whether the
particular condition was dangerous,' whether defendant knew or
should have known of the dangerous condition,7 and whether the
plaintiff's injury was caused by the defective condition.8
Since evidence of prior accidents is generally admissible to show
defendant's negligence, it would seem logical to permit the defendant
to introduce evidence of the absence of prior accidents to show non-
negligence. On this point, however, there is considerable judicial dis-
agreement. The majority of courts, while admitting evidence of prior
accidents, have excluded evidence of the non-occurrence of such acci-
dents.?"1 Some of these courts have merely stated that such evidence
is not relevant in the determination of negligence.' Other courts,
while not denying that the evidence is relevant, have excluded such
evidence on the ground that it would raise innumerable collateral
issues' which would merely serve to confuse the jury." Other reasons
G, Cogswell v. C. C. Anderson Stores Co., 68 Idaho 205 192 P2d 383 (1948);
Robitaille v. Netoco Community Theatre, Inc., 305 Mass. 285, 25 NYE2d 704, 159(1940) (dictum); Tr utan, supra note 3, at 401.
2 WVoiRqoa, EvIwxc § 252 (3d ed. 1940); McCoasucX, EviNuCZc § 167
(1954).
8. Gorman v. County of Sacramento, 92 Cal. App. 656, 268 Paz 1083 (1928);
Wight v. H. G. Christman Co., 244 Mich. 208, 221 N.W. 314 (1928); MoCoauc,
EvIDENCE § 167 (1954).
9. Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ml. App. 225, 14 NXE2d 879 (1988);
Jackson v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 238 Iowa 125330 N.W.2d 97 (1947);
Henderson v. Bjork Monument Co., 222 MiUn. 241, 24 N.W.2d 42 (1946); Traut-
man. satpra note 3, at 402-03.
10. Murphy v. County of Lake, 106 Cal. App. 2d 61, 234 P.2d 712 (1951);
Burgess v. Davis Sulphur Ore Co., 165 Mass. 71, 42 N.E. 501 (1896); Haverkost
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 193 S.W.2d 357 (Mo. App. 1946); Annot 1 A. I.2d
190, 215 (1953). Evidence of prior accidents also has been excluded 6 ecause in the
particular case there was no need for such evidence since the condition was obvi-
ously dangerous, Kirchoff v. Hohnsbehn Creamery Supply Co., 148 Iowa 508, 123
NW. 210 (1909); Wright v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 195 Mo. App. 485. 193
S.W, 91;3 (1917), or because of the dissimilarity of the circumstances, Smith v.
Town of Milford, 89 Conn, 24, 92 AtI. 675 (1914). It should be noted that these
same objections could be used to exclude evidence of the occurrence of prior acci-
dents. McCoRnmcK, EvEnxcs § 167 (1954).
11. Louisville & NJLR. v. temper, 153 Ind. 618, 53 N.E. 931 (1899), Johns
v. Kansas City Pub. Serr. Co., 360 Mo. 429, 228 S.W.2d 796 (1950), rutma,
n,'pra note 3, at 403. In Chase v. Wabash TR.., 156 Mo. App. 696, i37 S.W. 999(1911), the court apparently conceded that evidence of the absence of prior ac-
cidents was relevant but excluded it on the ground that admission of such evi-
dence would result in the conclusion that a condition is not dangerous until the
first accident occurs.
12. It would seem that evidence of the absence of prior accidents is clearly
within the usual definition of relevant evidence. Evidence is relevant if It
tends to establish the proposition for which it is offered. For a definitive dis-
cussion of relevancy, see James, Relevancy, Probabzlity and th Law, 29 CALW. L.
Rnv. 689# (1941).
1.3. Wigmore treats this as a matter of "auxiliary probative policy." 2 WG-
MORE, EvwExcE § 458 (3d ed. 1940).
14. Cassanova v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc, 204 La. 813, 16 So. 2d
444 (1943); Aldrich v. Inhabitants of Pelham, 67 Mass. (I Gray) 510 (1864).
In Blackwell v. J. J. Newberry Co., 156 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. App. 1941), the court
said that It would not adopt an absolute rule of exclusion, but would admit such
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss1/14
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advanced for exclusion are that such evidence would unduly prejudice
the jury, or surprise the adversary,15 or would be inadmissible under
the hearsay rule.'16
The trend of recent decisions, however, is to admit evidence of the
non-occurrence of prior accidents, in the court's discretion, to aid in
determining whether the condition was such that accidents were likely
to occur,17 whether the defendant knew or should have known that the
condition was dangerous, 8 whether the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent or assumed the risk,19 whether the condition was the cause
of the injury,20 and whether the condition was maintained with due
care by the party responsible.2 These courts do not overlook the ob-
jections advanced as reasons for exclusion. Thus, they will exclude the
evidence if it lacks probative value and tends only to introduce col-
lateral issues and unnecessarily confuse the jury.22 Again, if the
evidence woud unduly prejudice the jury or surprise the opponent, the
trial judge may exercise his discretion to exclude it. In answer to the
hearsay objection, it has been held that such evidence is not hearsay
in that the questions do not call for out-of-court statements but merely
for the personal knowledge and experience of the witness.23
The decisions of those courts which admit evidence of the non-
occurrence of prior accidents seem to be better-reasoned. It ap-
pears to be a paradoxical position for the courts to allow evidence
of prior accidents and at the same time to exclude evidence of the
absence of such accidents. Experience has always been a guide for
human conduct-the fact that certain events do not occur is virtually
evidence where the party opponent was given an opportunity to rebut the testi-
mony and any inferences raised therefrom. But Johnson v. Kansas City Pub.
Serv. Co., 360 Mo. 429, 228 S.W.2d 796 (1950) clearly shows that an absolute
rule of exclusion is followed in Missouri.
15. Branch v. Libbey, 78 Me. 321, 5 Atl. 71 (1886); Blackwell v. J. J. Newberry
Co., 156 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. App. 1941).
16. Woodward Iron Co. v. Spencer, 194 Ala. 285, 69 So. 902 (1915); Blackwell
v. J. J. Newberry Co., 156 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. App. 1941).
17. Cook v. Leavenworth Terminal Ry. & Bridge Co., 101 Kan. 103, 165 Pac.
803 (1917); Albertson v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 64 N.W.2d 175 (Minn.
1954); Menard v. Cashman, 93 N.H. 273, 41 A.2d 222 (1945) (dictum). See also
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 167 (1954); Morris, Proof of Safety History in Negli-
gence Cases, 61 HARV. L. REV. 205 (1948).
18. Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N.E.2d 879 (1938).
See also McCoRMCK, EVIDENCE § 167 (1954); Morris, supra note 17, at 233;
Trautman, supra note 3, at 402-03.
19. In Jackson v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 238 Iowa 1253, 30 N.W.2d 97(1947), the plaintiff used the evidence as tending to show he neither appreciated
the risk nor knew that the condition was dangerous.
20. See, e.g., Birmingham Union Ry. v. Alexander, 93 Ala. 133, 9 So. 525(1891).
21. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Lint, 217 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1954) (applying
Minnesota law); see Morris, supra note 17, at 233.
22. Cook v. Leavenworth Terminal Ry. & Bridge Co., 101 Kan. 103, 165 Pac.
803 (1917); Henderson v. Bjork Monument Co., 222 Minn. 241, 24 N.W.2d 42
(1946).
23. Howe v. Jameson, 91 N.H. 55, 13 A.2d 471 (1940).
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as important as the fact that they do. Again, the whole atmosphere of
scientific research is grounded upon a cause and effect relationship.
Thus, those courts that exclude such evidence are denying the product
of experience. It is not proposed that such evidence raise a presump-
tion of non-negligence or that it be determinative of the issue, but it
should be a factor to be considered by the jury. While it may be true
that evidence of the absence of prior accidents is not so persuasive as
the affirmative evidence of the occurrence of such accidents, this should
affect only the weight, not the admissibility of the evidence. When
such evidence has probative value, and when its inclusion would not
be disproportionate to its usefulness-i.e., result in confusion of is-
sues, unfair surprise, or undue prejudice2 -there does not appear to
be a sound basis for exclusion. It is hoped that the Missouri courts
will change their position and allow the trial judge, in the exercise
of his sound discretion, to admit evidence of the non-occurrence of
prior accidents.
24. Henderson v. Bjork Monument Co., 222 Minn. 241, 24 N.W.2d 42 (1946);
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 458 (3d ed. 1940).
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